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Global Catastrophic Biological Risks
Pandemics, Severity, and Context—Some Loose Ends
Lone Simonsen and Cecile Viboud
The thoughtful article by Schoch-Spana et al offersa welcome opportunity to reflect on the most severe
pandemic events of natural origin, particularly as we are
approaching the centennial of the 1918 Spanish influenza
pandemic—the most recent global event that fulfills the
proposed GCBR definition. We would like to highlight a
few issues that we have pondered over the years while
studying historical and contemporary pandemics in relation
to perceived pandemic impact and preparedness planning.
A measure of geographic spread should be included in
the GCBR definition. In the world of influenza, a pan-
demic is defined as a novel virus that spreads to at least 2
world regions; and following the unexpectedly mild 2009
pandemic, a measure of clinical severity was added in order
to better tailor the strength of interventions. It seems to us
that the GCBR definition may be lacking a geographical
dimension. For example, would a pathogen that devastated
1 big city or a single country fit the definition? On the
flipside, the 1918 pandemic was associated with a death rate
of 1% to 2%, which seems low in comparison to other
threats; but given its broad geographic extent, the total
death toll amounts to as many as 50 million deaths in
today’s population, over a few months.
Early robust measurement of clinical severity is chal-
lenging in an emerging threat scenario. As the authors point
out, the case fatality rate of the 2009 pandemic was at first
overestimated, likely due to selection bias in the study of
early case series. On the other hand, the first pandemic wave
in the summer of 1918 was mild, and early measurement
would have resulted in substantial underestimation of the
serious main pandemic wave that autumn. The first type of
measurement issue is being addressed; the second is impos-
sible to gauge. Perhaps just knowing that this is possible, that
a scenario goes from mild to severe, is worth remembering.
On the upside, a mild herald wave provides time to mount a
vaccine response before the main pandemic impact occurs.
Pandemic threats clearly go beyond influenza A viruses.
For decades, pandemic planning has been synonymous
with influenza preparedness, with severe scenarios modeled
after the experience of the 1918 pandemic.1 Meanwhile,
other zoonoses have presented themselves as credible pan-
demic threats. For example, while we were concerned about
the rise of avian A/H5N1 influenza in China in 2003, it was
the SARS coronavirus that emerged and spread globally
that year. And more recently, pathogens that had previously
been causing sporadic and localized outbreaks, such as
Ebola and Zika, have reemerged in urban settings and new
regions to pose a global pandemic threat. Further, historic
epidemiologic records are ripe with mortality events of pan-
demic proportions caused by a variety of pathogens, indicating
it is critical to think beyond influenza in pandemic pre-
paredness plans. The GCBR definition outlined by Schoch-
Spana et al is broad thinking in this respect, echoing the
World Bank’s $500 million investment on pandemic insur-
ance for 6 viruses (influenza A, SARS, MERS, Ebola, Mar-
burg, Crimean Congo, Rift Valley, and Lassa fever) or CEPI’s
focus on noninfluenza viruses (MERS, Nipah, Lassa fever).
Quantitative studies of historical pandemic events are
key. Because of the dearth of human population experi-
ences with GCBR-type events in the past hundred years, it
is critical to conduct careful studies of historical pandemics,
starting with the bubonic plague era, in order to elucidate
the transmission patterns and impact of past pandemic
events in various settings, populations, and circumstances.
In European countries, for example, excellent health re-
cordkeeping, availability of population censuses, and other
demographic studies allow reconstruction of epidemics of
plague, smallpox, cholera, and influenza pandemics over
centuries. Also, as regards reemerging threats like yellow
fever in Brazil in 2016-17, a careful review of the devas-
tating outbreaks in the Americas in the 19th century would
provide a sobering context.
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A severe pandemic event may not be risky to everyone.
As an example, the 1918 pandemic was devastating espe-
cially to young adults (about 6% of this age group died),
while the elderly were completely spared in many settings,
most likely due to immune protection from childhood
experience with a similar influenza virus. Thus, profound
age-related risk heterogeneity is a scenario that should be
taken into account in future pandemics. In addition, het-
erogeneity could be related to geography, climate, under-
lying health, and environmental factors, as well as social
(exposure limited to a subgroup of the population), be-
havioral (HIV), and genetic aspects.
Pandemic threats can be context-dependent. Some dis-
eases transmit effectively and proceed to infect a local pop-
ulation nearly completely but then fail to spread to other
populations. For example, influenza pandemics circum-
navigate the globe in months and cannot be halted before
population immunity is substantial—due to a combination
of high transmissibility (Ro >2), airborne spread, nonspecific
symptoms, and short incubation periods. Meanwhile, a
pandemic threat like the recent 2014 Ebola caused substantial
outbreaks in urban, mobile, poor West African populations
but was halted at a point when only a small subset of the
population was immune and did not cause widespread epi-
demics in other countries. Some, like the severe cholera
pandemics of 19th century Europe, were fueled by lack of
sanitary conditions but would be unthinkable there nowa-
days, although the pathogen continues to cause epidemics in
lower-income settings. Thus, measures of transmissibility and
clinical severity are important but not sufficient to understand
the global pandemic potential of an emerging pathogen. An
assessment also must learn about the type of transmission,
environmental requirements including hygiene, and climate
barriers related to vector-borne transmission, as well as pre-
existing immunity.
Thinking beyond mortality as an outcome is impor-
tant. We fully concur that consideration of other metrics
beyond mortality is important. The recent experience of
devastating cases of microcephaly in the Americas following
Zika virus infection during pregnancy is a case in point.
Similarly, the death toll of the 2009 pandemic was low in
high-income countries, probably mostly due to intense and
costly intensive care treatment of an unusual number of
severely ill young adults.
In conclusion, we believe there is a need for more studies
of past experience with natural pandemics and pandemic
threats, in order to elucidate the complex relationship
among pathogen, host, and population immunity, as well
as environmental conditions that together shape the mor-
tality impact. Clearly, cholera outbreaks can only occur in
settings with poor hygiene. But what might happen if
the smallpox virus were to reemerge in today’s population?
The answer is not straightforward, considering on one hand
the general susceptibility to this pathogen in those under 50
years of age who were never vaccinated and the increased
population size and mobility, and on the other hand, the
improved general immune status and better hygiene, sug-
gesting less severe outcomes of infection. This is an example
of a million-dollar question that needs to be addressed to
help prepare for the threat of GCBRs.
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